Tipping the Balance for Cash Balance Plan Sponsors Under the New Pension Act and in the Wake of Cooper v. IBM
By
Andrea S. Rattner, Myron D. Rumeld, and Russell L. Hirschhorn
|
Andrea S. Rattner and Myron D. Rumeld are partners and Russell L.
Hirschhorn is an associate in Proskauer Rose LLP’s Employee
Benefits and Executive Compensation Law Group. Rattner focuses on the
design and legal aspects of all types of benefit and compensation
plans and arrangements; Rumeld and Hirschhorn focus on ERISA
litigation relating to all types of benefit
plans. |
During the past two decades, many companies have begun offering
their employees retirement benefits through a cash balance or other
hybrid-type plan formula rather than a traditional defined benefit
plan formula, such as a final average pay plan or career average pay
plan. Although these plans have become increasingly popular, they have
been subject to legal challenge and uncertainty in recent years for
many reasons, including:
(i) the
Internal Revenue Service’s (“IRS”) moratorium on
issuing determination letters on cash balance plans since September
1999;
(ii) the
failure of the U.S. Department of Treasury and IRS to issue concrete
guidance of the requirements to maintain these
plans;1 and
(iii) a
district court decision in 2003, Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension
Plan,2 which concluded
that cash balance plans are age discriminatory.
In addition, the
plaintiffs’ bar has been vigilant in its attack on cash balance
plans asserting a variety of other claims, such as accrued benefit and
disclosure-related
claims.
3
As a result of two recent significant developments that affect cash
balance and other hybrid pension plans, however, plan sponsors and
fiduciaries are breathing a sigh of relief. First, on Aug. 17, 2006,
the President signed the Pension Protection Act of
20064 (the “Act”),
which affirms the legitimacy of these plans on a prospective basis if
certain new requirements are met. Second, in a long-awaited decision,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued its decision
in Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan, ---- F.3d. ----, 38 EBC
1801 (8/25/06) (7th Cir. Aug. 7, 2006), ruling that cash balance plans
do not violate the prohibitions against age discrimination under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended
(“ERISA”).
Although these recent developments certainly “tip the
balance” in favor of cash balance plan sponsors, they do not
resolve all legal issues pertaining to these plans. The Act’s
new requirements, in fact, leave a number of questions unanswered,
some of which are expected to be addressed by Treasury regulations. In
addition, although the Act addresses the rate of benefit accrual
claims (discussed below) on a going-forward basis, cash balance and
other hybrid plans in existence prior to the Act’s effective
date remain subject to these claims outside the Seventh Circuit.
This article discusses the cash balance provisions of the Act and
the Cooper decision as well as the possible implications for
plan sponsors and fiduciaries.
Hybrid Plans Generally.
Cash balance and other hybrid pension plans are defined benefit
pension plans that contain features of both defined benefit plans and
defined contribution plans. Many employers have adopted these plans
(or converted traditional defined benefit plans into hybrid plans) in
order to provide employees with a specified retirement benefit at
normal retirement age in an easy-to-understand manner.
Under a cash balance plan, a hypothetical account is established in
each participant’s name. Each participant is credited with an
employer’s hypothetical contributions (compensation credits) and
hypothetical earnings (interest credits). Compensation credits are
usually expressed as a percentage of pay, which may be tied to age and
years of service. Interest credits may be at a fixed interest rate, or
tied to an extrinsic index. Although compensation credits cease when a
participant terminates employment, interest credits continue until the
date the pension benefit is distributed to the participant.
Other hybrid plans such as pension equity plans (commonly referred
to as “PEPs”) provide a benefit that equals a percentage
of final average pay, with the percentage based on points earned by
the participant each year. Many of the issues raised with cash balance
plans (particularly, age discrimination claims) have been raised with
PEPs and other hybrid plans.
Under ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the
“Code”), benefits paid from cash balance plans (and other
defined benefit plans) must be paid as a life annuity commencing at
normal retirement age unless the plan permits benefits to be paid in
other forms, such as a lump
sum.5 If a cash balance plan
permits benefits to be paid as a lump sum, the plan must calculate a
participant’s hypothetical account balance at normal retirement
age (using the plan’s interest credit rate) and then discount
that benefit to its present value at the date of distribution (using
the statutory interest rate).
Issues Covered By the Act and Cooper.
The Act addresses on a prospective basis several issues pertaining
to cash balance and other hybrid plans, including, without limitation:
(i) the rate of benefit accrual; (ii) an interest requirement; (iii)
conversions; (iv) elimination of the “whipsaw” effect; (v)
vesting; and (vi) mergers and
acquisitions.6 The
Cooper decision, discussed below, only addresses the first of
these issues.
Rate of Benefit Accrual.
Since 1986, the Code, ERISA and the Age Discrimination In
Employment Act (“ADEA”) have contained parallel provisions
prohibiting age discrimination in benefit accruals under a defined
benefit pension plan by providing that “the rate of an
employee’s benefit accrual may not be reduced, because of the
attainment of any age.”7
The plaintiffs’ bar contends that cash balance plans violate
these statutes even though compensation credits earned by older
employees will be equal to or greater than the compensation credits
earned by younger employees, because younger employees’
compensation credits may grow to a larger sum at retirement age due to
the additional time in which interest credits accrue.
In fact, dozens of lawsuits have been filed against plan sponsors
and fiduciaries nationally asserting this claim as a result of the
district court decision in
Cooper,8 wherein the
court concluded that IBM’s cash balance plan was age
discriminatory because the projected benefit (at normal retirement
age) earned in earlier years by younger people is greater than for
older people in light of the accrual from the continued crediting of
interest. If universally followed, it would have undermined the
legality of all cash balance plans, not just the one sponsored by
IBM.
Fortunately for plan sponsors and fiduciaries, the Seventh Circuit
reversed the district court’s decision in Cooper and held
that merely because a younger person has more time to accrue interest
before normal retirement age (all other things being equal), a cash
balance plan formula should not be treated as age discriminatory. In
so holding, the Court reasoned that the age discrimination provisions
for defined contribution and defined benefit plans (as applied to cash
balance plans) both essentially make reference to the
“contributions” to a participant’s account as
opposed to the benefit payable from a participant’s account.
Further, the Court observed that there is nothing in the legislative
history to suggest that Congress set out to prohibit plans from
providing younger workers, who have statistically more time left
before retirement, with the opportunity to earn more interest than
older workers.
The Act now makes it clear that hybrid plans will not be treated on
a going-forward basis as violating the age discrimination provisions
under the Code, ERISA and ADEA if a participant’s “accrued
benefit,”9 determined as
of any date, would be equal to or greater than that of any similarly
situated (i.e., identical in every respect except for age) younger
individual who is or could be a
participant.10 The Act gives
examples of what it means to be identical “in every
respect” and includes “period of service, compensation,
position, date of hire, work history, and any other respect except for
age.” To achieve this result, these statutes provide that in
determining whether a plan is age discriminatory, benefits may be
calculated in ways other than as an accrued benefit (i.e., an annuity
payable at age normal retirement age), such as by using the balance of
a hypothetical account or the current value of the accumulated
percentage of the participant’s final average
compensation.
Interest Requirement.
The Act further provides that in order to satisfy the benefit
accrual rules, the interest credit under a cash balance or other
hybrid plan cannot be at a rate that is greater than a market rate of
return. A plan is permitted to provide for a reasonable minimum
guaranteed rate of return or for a rate of return that is equal to the
greater of a fixed or variable rate of return. Interest credits of
less than zero cannot result in a participant’s account dropping
below the aggregate amount of contributions credited to the
account.
There are a number of open questions regarding what constitutes a
“market rate of return,” the method of crediting interest
and the method for crediting negative returns without reducing the
aggregate amount of contributions credited to an account. The Act
permits Treasury to issue regulations that will provide rules
governing the calculation of a market rate of return and regarding
permissible methods of crediting interest.
Special rules concerning the interest rates and mortality tables
apply upon a plan termination. Among other things, these rules require
the averaging of interest rates over a five-year period ending on the
termination date in the case of a plan that uses a variable
rate.
Conversions.
As part of the conversion from a traditional defined benefit plan
to a hybrid plan, some plan sponsors set participants’ opening
hypothetical account balances below their accrued benefit. The net
result is that participants will fail to accrue an increase in
benefits until their hypothetical account balance and subsequent
accruals exceed their former accrued benefits--that is, the difference
“wears away” over a period of time. Although the terms of
the plan in these cases provide that a participant would never receive
less than the accrued benefit in effect immediately before the
conversion, the plaintiffs’ bar has argued in several cases that
this practice violates the Code and ERISA’s prohibition on
decreasing a participant’s “accrued benefit.”
The Act effectively prohibits new hybrid plans from instituting a
wear-away insofar as it requires that in a conversion to a cash
balance plan, the minimum benefit provided cannot be less than a
participant’s benefit prior to the conversion plus the benefit
earned after the conversion. In calculating the minimum benefit under
the converted plan, early retirement benefits and retirement-type
subsidies relating to pre-conversion service must be included if the
participant has met the requirements for entitlement to such benefit
or subsidy. The Act also calls for Treasury to issue regulations
designed to prevent plan sponsors from indirectly implementing
wear-away provisions through multiple plans or
amendments.
Whipsaw.
As discussed above, if a plan permits benefits to be paid in a lump
sum, the plan must calculate a participant’s hypothetical
account balance at normal retirement age and then discount that
benefit to its present value at the date of distribution. If the
interest rate that applies under the plan is higher than the rate that
is used to discount the participant’s benefit back to present
value (set by the Code), distribution of the amount in the
participant’s hypothetical account balance causes an
impermissible forfeiture under ERISA. This phenomenon is known as
“whipsaw.” To avoid whipsaw, many plans set the interest
crediting rate at the rate equal to or higher than the present value
rate, the latter of which causes the distribution of a lump sum to
exceed the participant’s hypothetical account balance and
creates an anomalous result.
Under the Act, the whipsaw problem has been eliminated, so that a
hybrid plan may pay out a participant’s account balance in a
lump sum provided that the plan uses a market rate of interest, as
described above. The Act also permits a plan to use a reasonable
minimum interest rate without incurring a whipsaw
problem.
Vesting Requirement.
Under the Act, the cash balance or other hybrid pension plan must
provide for three year vesting with respect to the participant’s
accrued benefit derived from employer
contributions.
Mergers and Acquisitions.
No later than twelve months after the Act’s enactment,
Treasury is directed to issue regulations addressing the application
of these rules to cash balance and other hybrid plan conversions
covering employees who become employees by reason of a merger,
acquisition or similar transaction.
Effective Dates.
In general, the provisions under the Act are effective on and after
June 29, 2005, although the provision relating to minimum value and
the directive to issue regulations relating to mergers and
acquisitions are effective on the date of the Act’s enactment.
The interest credit and vesting rules for existing plans generally
apply to years beginning after 2007, although an employer may elect to
have the rules apply to any period after June 29, 2005. Additional
delays may apply for collectively bargained plans.
The Act expressly provides that nothing in it should be construed
to infer the treatment of hybrid plans or conversions to such plans
under the rules prohibiting age discrimination as in effect before the
Act is effective. In addition, no inference is to be drawn with
respect to the application of the minimum benefit rules to hybrid
plans before the provision is
effective.
Implications for Plan Sponsors and Fiduciaries.
With the passing of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Congress
has finally affirmed the legitimacy and the legality of cash balance
and other hybrid plans and has provided plan sponsors and fiduciaries
with a level of comfort that these plans may be created and maintained
in the future. Further, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
Cooper provides an additional layer of comfort for those plan
sponsors that had converted their plans to a cash plan or other hybrid
plan prior to the Act’s effective date. Although the
Cooper decision is not binding on any court outside the Seventh
Circuit, combined with the passage of the Act, it certainly
“tips the balance” in favor of concluding that cash
balance and other hybrid plans are not age discriminatory. It is by no
means guaranteed, however, that such claims will not continue with
respect to plans in existence prior to Act’s effective date. In
fact, both age claims discussed above are on appeal to the Third and
Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeal11 where the issues will
be addressed with respect to cash balance plans in existence before
the effective date of the Act.
Further, as the IRS has not issued any determination letters for
cash balance plans since its moratorium beginning in September 1999,
it is not entirely clear when and under what circumstances the IRS
will review submissions for favorable determination letters and issue
such letters.
What is clear is that additional guidance is necessary and will
likely follow with respect to certain aspects of the Act (but not
necessarily all). In the interim, plan sponsors and fiduciaries should
continue to monitor case law developments and begin to review their
existing cash balance and other hybrid plans as well as any
conversions to these plans in light of the changes under the Act.
1
In June 2004, Treasury withdrew its proposed cash balance regulations in order to provide Congress with an opportunity to review and consider a legislative proposal on cash balance plans. See Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.411(b).
2
Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan,
274 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 30 EBC 2571 (S.D. Ill. 2003).
3
See, e.g., Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan, No. 05 Civ. 3588, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 20128, 38 EBC 1801 (8/25/06), 151 PBD, 8/8/06 (7th Cir. Aug. 7, 2006); Campbell v. BankBoston,
327 F.3d 1, 30 EBC 1001 (1st Cir. 2003) (questioning the validity of legal challenges to cash balance plans under ERISA §204(b)(1)(H)); Hirt v. The Equitable Retirement Plan for Employees, Managers and Agents, No. 01 Civ. 7920, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49145, 140 PBD, 7/24/06 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2006); Richards v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp.,
427 F. Supp. 2d 150, 37 EBC 1449 (D. Conn. 2006); Register v. PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 6097, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29678, 36 EBC 1321 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2005), appeal pending, 06 Civ. 5445 (3d Cir.); Wells v. Gannet Retirement Plan,
385 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (D. Colo. 2005); Tootle v. ARINC, Inc.,
222 F.R.D. 88, 93, 32 EBC 2665 (D. Md. 2004); Engers v. AT&T Corp., No. 98 Civ. 3660, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25885 (D.N.J. June 6, 2001); Eaton v. Onan Corp.,
117 F. Supp. 2d 812, 191 PBD, 10/2/00 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
4
Pub. L. No. 109-280.
5
Code §§411(a), 417(e).
6
Sections 701 and 702 of the Act.
7
29 U.S.C. §1054(b)(1)(H)(i); 26 U.S.C. §411(b)(1)(H); 29 U.S.C. §623(i).
8
See, e.g., supra at n.5.
9
A participant’s accrued benefit will not be age discriminatory under the Act solely because a cash balance plan provides for: (i) offsets generally permitted under tax-qualified plans; (ii) permitted disparity (i.e., Social Security integration of contributions and benefits); and (iii) periodic adjustment of the accrued benefit by means of the application of a recognized investment index and methodology. Further, in determining a participant’s “accrued benefit” as of any date for purposes of this requirement, the subsidized portion of any early retirement benefit or retirement-type subsidy is disregarded. For older participants who ultimately receive subsidized benefits, this approach may result in an unintended windfall to them. As a result, this provision may have the perverse effect of discouraging employers from adopting early retirement enhancements in their cash balance plans.
10
Section 701(a)(1), 701(b)(1) and 701(c)(1) of the Act (amending ERISA §204(b), Code § 411(b), and ADEA § 4(i), respectively).
11
See Register v. PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 6097, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29678, 36 EBC 1321 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2005); Hurlic v. S. Ca. Gas Co., No. 05 Civ. 5027 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2005).